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The Supreme Court of Alabama in the recent case of Beggs v.
The Edison Electric Light &- Illuminating Co., ii Sou. Rep. 381,
took occasion to decide the question in that State, as to whether
an electric light company was a manufacturing company within
the meaning of that section of the Code of 1886 providing rules
for the consolidation of manufacturing corporations. This has
only been considered in two other States- Pennsylvania and
New York -and the decisions in these cases were directly oppo-
site. (See Vol. I. of THE JOURNAL, page 123.) The Alabama
court follows the reasoning of the New York case and bases its
decision largely on the meaning of the word manufacture as ordi-
narily understood. It is evident that the business of producing
electricity requires the investment of capital in a plant and the
consumption of large quantities of coal in the operation of exceed-
ingly complicated machinery. The substance produced, whether
a material substance or a form of energy, is distributed through
an extensive system of cables, mains and wires, and is of obvious
utility. This is to all intents and purposes a manufacturing
operation, and, in the absence of any express statute, it will prob-
ably be so held in other States in which the question may arise.
* *
The question of what constitutes "a quorum" of members
present at any meeting, which has within the past year provoked
so much discussion, both political and judicial, still occasionally
intrudes itself before our various courts and demands solution.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has recently put its sanction on
the much mooted method adopted by the Speaker of the House in
the LI. Congress. In the case of State ex. rel. Walden v. Vanosdal,
31 N. E. Rep. 79, they held, "that when, at a regular meeting
of school trustees, three of the trustees refused to act longer and
withdrew from the place where the balloting was being held into
a crowd of spectators, -but without leaving the room, the quorum
is not broken, though they may refuse to vote and protest against
further action, and where the remaining trustees cast their ballots
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for a person he is duly elected, the retiring trustees being properly
treated as being present and not voting."
In the recent case of The Badger Lumber Company v. The Marion
Water Supply, Electric Light and Power Company the Supreme Court
of Kansas has handed down a decision which has been productive
of much favorable comment. The original action was for the
enforcement of a mechanic's lien under a Kansas statute which
provided that "any mechanic or other person who shall, under
contract with the owner of any tract or piece of land * * *
perform labor or furnish material for erecting, altering or repair-
ing any building or the appurtenance of any building, or any
erection or improvement, or shall furnish or perform labor in the
putting up of any fixture in or attachment to any such building or
improvement, * * * shall have a lien upon the whole piece
or tract of land, the building and appurtenances, in the manner
herein provided," etc.
The case was subrfitted to the lower court upon an agreed
statement of facts which set forth that the defendant was a com-
pany operating an electric light plant and furnishing light for the
city of Marion; that it had a franchise to use the streets of the
city for the erection of poles and stretching of wires thereon ;
that the defendant company had so used the streets ; that the
plaintiff furnished the poles upon which the wires were stretched ;
that defendant had actually operated its plant and furnished light
for different portions of the city ; and that none of the material
furnished by the plaintiff was actually situated upon the premises
upon which the electric light plant was located and upon which
plaintiff sought to enforce a lien. Upon this statement of facts
the trial court awarded a personal judgment against the defendant
but refused to enforce the lien, upon the ground that no part of
the material furnished by the plaintiff was on the real estate of
the defendant or attached thereto in any manner except by the
wires stretched from the poles of the defendants.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the
poles and wires were appurtenances of the defendant's premises,
and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to a lien under the
statute. Johnston J. in giving the, opinion of the court dwells at
some length upon the question of what constitutes an appurte-
nance. Upon a rehearing of the case the court held that the
defendant having a franchise to occupy the streets of the city was
not so distinctively public in its nature and operations as to
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exempt its property from the application of the mechanic's lien
statute. Both the points decided by the court seem to be thor-
oughly founded upon reason and justice and the case will
undoubtedly be received by other courts as authority.
The passage of the "Miner Law" in Michigan, under which
presidential electors are chosen by congressional districts instead
of by the State at large, marks what might prove to be an impor-
tant epoch in our constitutional history should other States join in
this departure from a mode of construction of the constitution
which has obtained for the last sixty years. While there is prob-
ably little danger of such a change on account of the resulting loss
of power to the individual State in political conventions as well as
the natural tendency to cling to a construction so long and uni-
versally employed, the well considered opinion of the court in
_ McPherson v. Blacker, 52 N. W. Rep. 469, upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Michigan law is well worthy of the careful reading
of the student of constitutional law.
It was contended that the "Miner Law" was in conflict with
Section i, Article 2, of the Federal Constitution, which provides
that "each State shall appoint in such manner as the legislature
thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole num-
ber of senators and representatives to which this State may be
entitled in the congress." And it was claimed that under this
section of the Constitution the State must in the choice of electors
act as a unit, and was not empowered to delegate the authority to
name electors to any fractional part of the State, as a district filed
for that purpose alone or for that and other political action. The
language of the section plainly admits of such a construction, and
the words "in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,"
could be held to confer only the limited power of directing how
the State acting as an entirety should make the appointment.
But in the first presidential election Maryland and Virginia
adopted the district plan, their example was followed by Massa-
chusetts and New York, and for forty years after the adoption of
the Constitution electors were chosen in several of the States by
districts. This practical contemporaneous interpretation the
court held to be decisive under the rule of resort to contempora-
neous construction so well recognized by the court and stated by
Judge Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations," that "when a
particular construction has been generally accepted as correct,
and especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with
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the adoption of the Constitution, and by those who had opportu-
nity to understand the intention of the instrument, it is not to be
denied that strong presumption exists that the construction
rightly interprets the intention." Since the above was written the
Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed the decision in
McPherson v. Blacker, which was taken to it on error to the Mich-
igan court.
The question was raised in the recent case of State v. Toland,
15 S. E. Rep. 599, whether a minor could legally act as special
deputy of the sheriff, and as such legally summon jurors under a
writ of venire. The Supreme Court of South Carolina took the
ground that as the minor was not required to give any bond, the
sheriff being made responsible by statute for his deputy's conduct,
he was not an "officer" in the proper sense of the word. The
minor was rather the agent of the sheriff : and as there can be no
question that a minor may act as the agent of another, the acts of
the minor in summoning jurors were legal. The case of R. R. Co.
v. Fisher, 13 S. E. Rep. 698, cited and approved as pointing out
the distinction between such a case as the one in hand and that of
Cuckson v. Winter, 17 E. L. C. 713.
In the case of in re King the facts were these: The plaintiff,
convicted of murder by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, peti-
tioned the United States Court of that district for the grant of a
writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that he had been convicted
by a jury not entirely impartial and that the constitutional provi-
sion that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury," etc.,
had been violated thereby.
It was held, that the writ of habeas corpus could not thus be
used as "a substitute for a writ of error, for the purpose of
reviewing alleged errors, either of fact or law, occurring at a
criminal trial, but, being in the nature of a collateral attack upon
the judgment, is limited to the inquiry whether the trial court has
acted without jurisdiction, or has exceeded its jurisdiction so as to
render the sentence void." The court then goes on to say that
this amendmen to the Constitution "is a qualification and regu-
lation relating exclusively to the judicial powers granted by the
Constitution of the United States, and has no reference to the
judicial power possessed and exercised under State authority."
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It would seem as if the learned judge differed in this point
from the usual authorities. We quote Farrar's Manual of the
Constitution (p. 395) as follows: "In these" (the first ten
amendments) "certain particular rights are plainly declared or
recognized as natural, legal, and subsisting rights of the people,
and so made their constitutional rights. They become a part of
the supreme law of the land, and so bind the government and all
subordinate governments -everybody in fact owing allegiance to
the Constitution." Ch. J. Spencer in People v. Goodwin, 18 John
R., 187, says of the V. Amendment, "the Article * * * does
extend to all the judicial tribunals in the United States whether
constituted by the Congress of the United States or the States
individually. * * * The Sixth Article of the Constitution
declares that the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the
land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any-
thing in the Constitution or laws of the State to the contrary not-
withstanding."
In Prigg's case, i6 Peters 628, Mr. Ch. J. Taney says, "The
Constitution of the United States and every article and clause in
it, is a part of the law of every State in the Union and is the para-
mount law."
While the judicial power of the United States undoubtedly
does not have the power to investigate errors made by a State
judiciary in passing on laws which are entirely constitutional, in a
constitutional way, yet it would seem as if under that instrument
which so high an authority as Ch. J. Marshall has said "was
made for the whole people of the Union and is equally binding
upon all the courts and all the citizens," would have the power to
prevent infringements by a State on the right of trial by jury in
criminal cases, as laid down in the VI. Amendment, one of the
clauses of that series of ten, which form "the bill of rights,"
demanded by the people, after the Constitution had been adopted
without one, and which was added as a safeguard to the liberties
of every citizen of the Union, against the encroachment of either
State or Federal powers.
On October i 7th the New York Court of Appeals handed down
its decision upon the validity of the Apportionment Act of 1892.
By a divided bench the act was declared to be constitutional.
Judge Peckham delivered the opinion of the majority of the court,
while Judge Andrews manifested his dissent by a vigorous opinion
in which Judge Finch concurred. The extent of legislative dis-
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cretion under the Constitution of the State of New York was the
point upon which the learned judges differed. Was there any
discretion left with the Legislature under the clauses of the Con-
stitution which provide that "Each Senate district shall contain
as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants, excluding
aliens," and that "the members of the Assembly shall be appor-
tioned among the several counties of the State by the Legislature,
as nearly as may be, according to the number of the respective
inhabitants, excluding aliens?" If such discretion existed was it
so plainly violated by the provisions of the Act of 1892 as to call
for judicial interference? These questions are most difficult to
answer. It would seem that the Constitution did not demand
absolute equality in the apportionment. Absolute equality would
be impossible. The Constitutional provisions are flexible enough
to allow of some inequalities, for by their very terms they imply
that such will exist. But as Judge Peckham said the apportion-
inent was not an "ideal" one. Legislatures, and especially State
Legislatures, are not apt to accomplish ideal results. Much less is
a legislature dominated by strong party influence, and smarting
under the injustice of the operation of a previous apportionment,
likely to pass a measure of this character which is even an approx-
imation to the ideal. As to whether legislative power, more or
less discretionary, had been abused is a question upon which the
fairest and most honest minds may well differ. What wonder
that judges should disagree upon it- what wonder that the
decision should be upon party lines ? Educated in different schools
of thought and arguing from principles fundamentally opposed, it
was but natural and logical that they should reach different results,
honestly and yet in accordance with party convictions.
